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Production and price policies for American upland cotton have 
been in effect during most of the last forty years. These programs 
have represented major efforts to improve the income position of 
u. s. cotton producers. However, general public agreement has not 
been attained on the type of program which is most acceptable. 
While numerous alternatives have been tried, each program has in• 
e luded features which either (1) did not solve the problem for 
which it was designed or (2) did not meet ,the approval of the 
numerous and diverse groups which have interests in u. s. cotton. 
Frequently, old programs have been abandoned and new programs 
initiated because the production, income, or cost effects were not 
the same as those anticipated. 
The lack of public agreement and logical development may 
best be explained by the following observation: 
An action program, when adopted, presupposed that 
a problem existed and that some agreement had been reached 
as to the relative efficiency of this program as compared 
with alternative programs. However, the mere fact that 
the democratic process was used in the selection and 
adoption of this program is not assurance that agreement 
was substantial. It could have represented a very small 
minority agreement. One can say only that an organized 
majority did not explicitly agree to oppose the program. 
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The ba s i s for agreement is usually the result of 
compromise or arbitra tion. It involves differences in the 
amounts of information avai lable to the various groups in• 
volved, differences in t he i nterpretations of the so-called 
'facts' and differences in beliefs concerning what 'ought 
to be 1 .l 
In addition, the accumulation of major legislation and 
subsequent amendments has caused both agricultural and non• 
agricultur al individua l s to voice concern and demonstrate con-
fusion over just what the present cotton program is, how it de· 
veloped, and possible future di r ections it might follow. Since 
the program has been developed over an extended period of time, 
one who attempts to unders t and it or predict future legislation 
would do well to keep in mi nd the following words of Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: 
The life of the law has not been logi c: i t has been 
experience. The felt necessit i es of the t ime, the pre• 
valent moral and political theories, intuitions of public 
policy, !_vowed or unconsc!.ous, even the prejudices which 
judges Land Congressmen_/ share with their fellow-men, 
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in 
determining t he rules by which men should be governed. 
The law embodies the s tory of a nation's development through 
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it con• 
tained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathe• 
matics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it 
has been, and what it t ends to become. We must alter2ately 
consult history and exis t ing theories of l egis lation. 
1 Leo V. Blakley, A Concept of Goals and Values, Agricultural 
Economics Paper No. 662, Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment St at i on 
(Stillwater: Oklahoma State Universi ty, 1966) , p . 1. 
20liver Wendell Holmes, Jr . , The Common Law (Bos ton: Li tt l e , 
Brown & Co., 1923), p. 1. 
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Objectives 
The major purpose of this study was to provide a history 
of past cotton l egislation which could permit a better under• 
standing of the present and potential future cotton programs. 
Part icular emphasis was placed on production and price legislation 
t hat affects the i ncome of cotton producers. 
Sp®cific obj ectives of this study were: (1) to present the 
historical development of governmental programs designed to 
achieve income obje~tivie t h.r ough specific means of price support, 
pr oduction controls, and export programs; (2) to present the 
i nterrela tionships existing between the specific programs and the 
prices and produc.tion of cotton as rel ated to the development of 
subsequent legislation. 
Scope of Study 
The s t udy is essentially an historical analysis designed 
to a dd perspective t o the present and future cotton programs. 
Not all legislation affecting the u. s. cotton industry was 
considered. I ns tead 9 primar y emphasi s was placed on specific 
agricultural l egislation direct l y related to cotton. Generally, 
a n attempt was ma.de to develop historically all legi slation directly 
pertaini ng to a specific means such as price supports. As back-
ground for the consider~tion of speci fic means, legislation in 
an hi$to~ic~l and theo~et ical economic framework i s presented 
i n Chapter II . Legislation directly r elated to price supports 
3 
for cotton is considered in Chapter III. Chapter IV contains 
the legislative history associated with production controls. 
Legislation involving multiple pricing plans and surplus disposal 
is presented in Chapter v. Finally, the summary and conclusions 
are presented in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER II 
LEGISLATION IN PERSPECTIVE 
In the private sector of the· u. s. economy, the market is 
the connecting link between the producer and the consumer. On 
the one hand, consumers' tastes, preferences, needs, and abilities 
to purchase determine the demand. Consumers take for granted 
that the products they want will be available in the quantities 
and qualities they desire at the time and place they are needed. 
On the other hand» resources utilized and the production environ• 
ment determine the supply of products to be sold. Producers 
expect the market to accept their products when they are ready to 
sell. Market price reflects the interaction of the forces of 
demand and supply. Price, therefore, becomes the crystallizing 
instrument of the market operation and determines both the consumer 
cost and the producer income for individual products. 
The theoretical "perfec t market", with its many buyers and 
many sellers having complete information and knowledge and all 
sellers deal i ng in absolutely uniform products with completely 
flexible resources, is presumed to . provide the economic climate 
which would give the greatest individual and social welfare. 
The flexible prices (influenced by supply and demand) help the 
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consumer in deciding on purchases and guides the producer in 
making production plans. In the economy as it exists, however, 
there are many imperfections in the markets for individual 
connnodities. Human judgment can be in error, information and 
knowledge are incomplete, products are not uniform, resources 
are inflexible, and some prices are administered. 
Early Government Programs 
There has been a trend over the years toward increased 
governmental participation in economic activity. This is. ex-
emplified by the fact that during the past forty years, signifi-
cant legislation affecting agricultural production and marketing 
has been passed in practically every session of Congress. Why 
this has happened ma.y be explained by the following quote: 
Governmental participation in economic life probably 
is not an explicit goal or value in the American economy. 
It is more likely to represent one of the alternative means 
of achieving certain goals or values.3 
Therefore, to the extent that this participation met the desires 
of the community, it reflected dissatisfaction with the adequacy 
of the market economy in obtaining the desired economic goals. 
The evolutionary process that resulted in low agricultural 
prices following Worl d War I brought on an era that produced the 
framework for present programs . Between May, 1920, and May, 1921, 
3Leo Vo Blakley 9 A Concept of Goals and Values , Agricultural 
Economics Paper No. 66 2, Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station 
(Stillwater: Oklahoma State Univers i ty, 1966), pp. 11·12. 
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prices received by farmers declined approximately 54 percent, 
while prices paid by farmers declined only 27 percent. The obvious 
result was an appreciable drop in the net incomes of farmers. 
Fortunately, general farm prices, including cotton prices, re• 
covered somewhat during the next few years. Yet the relationship 
between prices received and prices paid by farmers remained 
below the pre-war levels. This price and income environment 
prompted farmers to seek federal government aid in order to 
modify and regulate agricultural commodity markets. 
On June 15, 1929, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing 
4 Act. With the passage of this Act came an attempt to support 
agriculture prices by orderly distribution or the establishment 
of an "ever-normal granary" type of program. The Federal Farm 
Board was established and received an appropriation of $500 
million to finance cooperative marketing associations that would 
perform loan•s torage functions during years of surplus production. 
The surplus crops were to be stored but when there was a reduction 
in the quantity or an increase in the demand, the surplus stocks 
would be moved back into the market. It was the belief that 
this procedure would stabilize farm prices and income. 
In regard to cotton» the Federal Farm Board established a 
Cotton Stabilization Corporati on. Loan operations on cotton 
were begun in October, 1929, the month of the devastating stock 
4u.so, Statutes at Large, XLVI, Public Law 10, 11. 
market crash. The loan level was 16 cents a pound. However, 
by July, 1931, the average loan price on cotton had declined 
to approximately 6 cents a pound. By 1932, a large part of the 
$500 million fund of the Farm Board had been utilized in loans on 
cotton and wheat (plus small proportions on several other commo-
dities), and by 1933, the funds were exhausted. However, the 
supplies of cotton and other commodtties had not been reduced 
enough to offset the decrease in demand and prices were at ex• 
tremely low levels . The Farm Board did not have the power to 
control output and, through storage alone, found itself unable 
to stabilize prices. Congress did not vote additional funds to 
carry out the loan-storage program and the Board was abolished 
in May» 1933. 
Since 1933, many farm bi.lls have been debated in Congress. 
All have rested upon one or a combination of three basic economic 
concepts: (1) price supports, (2) production controls» and 
(3) multiple pricing. 
Price Supports 
Price support is the application of an administered price. 
It can be accomplished only by a single seller with some degree 
of monopoly control s~tting the price of the commodity. The 
result is pri.ce stability with varying quantities sold in final 
consumption outlets. A variation of the direct price support 
program is the direct payment program. With direct paymentsp 
8 
the quantity sold to consumers would equal the quant i ty pr oduced 
and the size of the payment would depend on t he apparent excess 
stocks which would exist at the "desirable" prices. 
Objectives 
The usual obj ectives of price supports are: (1) to r aise 
the level of agricultural i ncome , (2) to provide greater economic 
security for farmers, and (3) to induce production adjustments. 
Cotton price pol icy has been concerned primar ily with the first 
objective. Price supports reduce excessive price variabilit.y 9 reduce 
uncertainty in the i nterests of better resource allocation , and 
restore and maintain a certain ba lance i n t erms of t r ade between 
various groups of commodities in their price relationships. 
However~ they do not necessarily i mprove the income distribution 
among producers or resul t i n the most efficient utiliza t i on of 
resources . 
Effects 
The theo~et ical f~amework for evaluating support prices 
5 is illustrated i n Figure 1. Let D and S represent t he Demand 
and Supply curves, respectively, for ~otton i n a one year period. 
Demand is defined as price~i nelastic ; suppl y is defined as 
perfectly inelastic i n order to reflec~ the fac t that producers 
could place the whole crop on the market for whatever price 
Spaul A. Sanmelsonv Economics: An Introductory Analysis 
(4th ed. rev.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958) 9 pp . 414- 15. 
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it would bringo The equilibrium price would be OP1• If the 
support price is OP29 the government would have to acquire amount 
Q 0Q. The cost to the gov~rnment.would be Q'Q multiplied by the 
support pri~e of OP2 or the rectangle Q9A13Q. Returns to farmers 
would be OP2,BQ. Th<e governmental ©Ost would be greater under 
elastic demand conditions than under highly price-inelastic 
demand conditions. Given Qj the more elastic demand~ the larger 
the purchase necessary to achieve any given price higher than 
equilibrium pric@o 
D 
0 Q Quantity 
Figur~ 1. Hypothetical Demand and Supply S~hedule for 
!Cott«:ln 
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Under direct payments, the equilibrium price and the market 
price would be OP1 and the support price could still be OP2• 
In this case, howeverv the total supply would be sold at OP1 
and the government would make up the difference between OP1 
and OP2• Each producer would get a payment equal to OP2 minus 
OP1 multiplied by the size of his crop. The total cost to the 
government of this kind of subsidy would be P1P2BC, and total 
returns to farmers would be OP2BQ. The relative size of the 
governmental outlay j under direc t payments as compared with 
direct price supports, would depend on the price elasticity of 
demand. With a given quantity produced and a given price support 
level, costs under direct payments would remain constant but 
government purchases under the price support program would 
i ncrease as the price elasticity of demand increased. 
Production Controls 
6 Production controls involve supply management. Supply 
management is the practice whereby, given certain conditions, the 
total quantity of a commodity marketed is limited to the effective 
market demand at a price deemed acceptable to both producers 
and consumers . I f effective 8 the produ~tion control program 
wi ll increase gross farm income under price-inelastic demand 
conditions because the percentage increase in price will be 
greater than the percentage decrease in production. I n factv 
11 
effective production controls can achieve the same price and income 
targets as direct price supports, although both production con• 
trols and price supports may be used concurrently. However, the 
ultimate success of production control programs will depend upon 
the production control feature s used, i.e . , acreage restriction, 
quantity produced restrictions, etc. 
Objectives 
The major objectives of production controls are t o: (1) in-
crease fann prices and income; (2) increase resource efficiency 
by limiting agricultural production to current needs ; and (3) re-
duce or minimize government costs of price and income support 
programs. The thh·d objec tive has, at times, appeared to be 
most important. When surplus stocks and government cos ts mount, 
voices are raised in favor of decreasing costs and excess pro• 
duction. Excess production is usually defined in terms related 
to "current needs" of the country. Current needs include domestic 
requirements, export r~quirements, and a possible national 
p.efense stockpile . By limiting production to this level, storage 
of additional stocks would not be required by the government. 
Effects 
If the demand for a commodity is inelastic, production con-
trols will result in higher total receipts to producers. Si nce 
production costs likely would decrease as quant i ty produced 
decreases, net returns should i ncrease relatively more than total 
receipts. Graphically, the effects should be the same as 
12 
illustrated in Figure 1 for price supports. Total returns to 
farmers would be OP2CB and government costs would be limited to 
the expense of administered controls. 
Supply can be controlled directly by restricting output or 
indirectly by restricting inputs. The emphasis in agricultural 
legislation has been on input restriction. The restriction of 
inputs has been applied chiefly to one factor - land. This 
has been admi nistered i n t wo general types of programs: (1) those 
which control land for a specific crop, such as the present 
acreage allotment and marke t i ng quota programs, and (2.) those 
which control cropland in general, such as the Soil Bank Program. 
Multiple pricing ~ or pt:-irce di scrimination, is the practice 
of charging differ ent prices for a homogeneous commodity in 
differ ent mar kets . 7 A seller possessi ng some degree of monopoly 
power may practice pri~e discrimination by artificially restricting 
the quantity sold i n p~rt icular markets while increasing the 
quant ity sold in ot her markets. The result is a set of price 
di ffer entials i n different markets which exceeds t he cost of 
t r ansfer to different markets. Multiple pricing also could be 
applied to producers i n setting the pr i ces they r ~ce.ive fo:r 
quantities enter i ng different mar kets. 
7 Preston I.aFer ney~ 11Analys i s o f Mult ipl e Pricing Plans for 
Food Commodities Produit:ed i n t he South" (unpub. Ph. D. dissertation » 
Oklahoma State University$ 1963) , pp. 5~22 . 
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Objectives 
The usual obj ectives under price discrimination are to: (1) in-
crease total returns; (2) stabilize total returns; and (3) influence 
consumption patterns . Total returns above those which would 
be received under a single price can be obtained under multiple 
pricing if certain conditions, discussed later, are fulfilled. 
If a given supply is divided into subparts for different markets, 
the price effect of supply fluctuations may be reduced and total 
returns stabilized. However» price discrimination can result in 
unstable consumption i n the secondary markets which, under certain 
conditions, can lead to less stability in total returns to the 
seller. Influencing consumption patterns may i nvolve surplus 
disposal as well a s foreign and domestic assistance. 
Conditions Necessary for Multiple Pricing 
Certain conditions are necessary to practice price discri• 
mination. The basic conditions include: 
1 . Monopoly power QA seller must be able to control the 
supply of the connnodity. I n the case of two-price 
programs for cotton 9 legislation has been the source of 
monopoly powe~. 
2. Two or more sub~ma~kets - The market must be capable of 
being diyided into one primary sub-market and one or 
more s€condary subamarkets . In order to increase returns 9 
a signifi~ant part of total supply must be sold in the 
higher pric~d primi6lry submmarket and the. secondary 
14 
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sub-markets must be able to absorb varying or expanding 
quanti.ties. In additionp the sub.,.markets must be kept 
separatev othe~'Wise buyers will buy in the low priced 
market for resale in the high priced market. In the case 
of cotton 9 the separation has been accomplished by 
restrictions on imports of raw cotton. 
3. Different price elasticities of demand in the sub-markets• 
Demands must diff@r among outlets so that decreasing sales 
in one outlet~ to achieve mo~® n®arly equal marginal 
revenues in each market, will yield higher aggregate 
returns. For producers, the question of relative 
elast.i~iti.®.$ in th® domestic and foreign markets may 
single p:r®d®t.einnined p:d1ee on all units sold. Howeverp 
the amount of government subsidy would depend on the 
ell.ai.s tic:l ty of dl®1iMmd in the ex.port market. The more 
costs in mrnring a given quantity into the iexpo:rt market 
Effects 
with reference to F.'igt1.ire 2. Let the left half of the diagram 
p&imary ma.rk®t. DJ and JD 1r®p:il:'®®®11t the linear net farm demands , p 
for the s®condaLty and pri!l1*iiry mark@ts lr®$pe~ ti v®ly. The verti<Cal 
axis, therefore, indi~ates prices at the farm level. 
I 






Figure 2o Genlf1?.ra1 Case: F,quil:L'brium Quantities and Prices 
undf.l"r a Multiple Pricing Plan. 
AHume that pl't'it.ei suppo'lt'ts a;i.lt'~ ceffeii11::tive at thei price P 1• 
At price I\, the quantity dll!lmand.ed in the secondary market.. will 
be Q8 • If more than QP ~ Q8 is produ.ced, then the government 
must buy and sto~® the ~otton in order to maint&in P19 thus 
in~urring ©~sts. 
The out~ome could b® altered by use of a multiple pricing 
Assume that eotton wa~ sold in the se©ondary market at pri~e P2 
with a subsidy eqv.ml to P1 minus P2 per pound. The quantity sold 
16 
in the secondary market would increase by Q~ • Qs while the 
quantity sold in the primary market would remain at Q. Assuming 
p 
production was restricted to QP r Qs, previous to the enactment 
of this plan, and Q t Qs afterward 9 producers' incomes would p 
increase by P1 (Q! 0 Qs) and government costs of the subsidy would 
be Q; (Pl • P 2) • 
Without benefit of price supports or special subsidies, 
price discrimination could be practical on behalf of producers. 
If production were Q:.;. Qpll the price in the primary market 
could be set at P1 and the price in the secondary market could 
be set at P2• For these prices, total returns to farmers would be 
Pi(QP) plus P2 (Q;) which would be greater than the equilibrium 
prices times the aggregate quantity (Q r Q8). Government costs p 
in this case would be limited to that incurred in administering 
price supports in the primary market. 
Cotton Market Situation 
The market situation for Uo s. cotton may best be described 
as a price-inelastic lagging demand versus an increasing supply. 
The lagging demand has resulted because rnanamade fibers and 
foreign cotton production have tended to offset potential demand 
expansion from increased consumer income and population growth. 
Technological innovations such as mechanization and irrigation 
have been major influ~nces in shifting cotton supplyo This 
combination has caused a continuous downward pressure on cotton 
prices and producersv incomes. 
17 
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Initially, price supports and production controls were 
implemented to improve cotton producers' incomes through higher 
cotton prices. The very nature of the shifting cotton supply, 
however, limited the effectiveness of this approach. In later 
years, multiple pricing plans were incorporated to make the pro• 
gram more effective by providing a means of relieving surplus 
accumulations and reducing government costs. 
18 
CHAPTER III 
THE LEVEL OF PRICE SUPPORTS 
A primary objective of price support programs as outlined 
in Chapter II is to maintain farm prices higher than they might be 
on t-he free market. To accomplish this objective, a program is 
initiated which would purchase from farmers any and all supplies of 
the supported commodity or make a differential payment to producers 
sufficient to guarantee a predetermined price level. The historical 
development of the price support programs pertaining to cotton is 
review@d in this Chapter. 
Initial Developments 
The Agricultural Act of 1933 
The economy of the United States was in the depths of a severe 
depression and all major segments of the economy, including agriculture, 
were experiencing difficult business conditions after 1929. For ex• 
ample, the price of cotton dropped from 16.31 to 6.09 cents per pound 
between 1929 and 1933 (Table I)o The depressed economic conditions 
stimulated new efforts to obtain government assistance for agriculture 









































PRICES AND PRICE SUPPORT LEVELS OF MIDDLING 




















25. 96 21.09 
34.82 24.38 
34.58 27.94 
32.15 30. 74 
31.83 29.43 
42.58 29.45 
39.42 31. 71 
34.92 31. 96 
33.55 32. 70 
34.02 33.23 
34.47 33.50 
32 .. 47 31.59 
33.04 31.16 
3.3.08 33.63 
30.33 32.60 (A); 26. 90 (B) 
29.50 30. 77 (A); 24. 98 (B) 
32.53 31.49 
32.26 31.22 
31. 85 31.22 
29.72 29.30 
for designated spot markets. 
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Price as 





































Sources: u.s., Dep~rtment of Agriculture, ERS, Statistics on Cotton 
and Related Data, 1925-1962, SB 329 and Supplement, January, 1964; and 
u.s., Department of Agriculture, ERS, The Cotton Situation, 1933-1965. 
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1933. 8 This program was only a part of the broad program designed to 
improve the entire economy. 
The Agri~ultural Act of 1933 was an attempt to establish the same 
ratio between the commodities sold by farmers and the commodities pur• 
chased by farmers as existed during the period from August, 1909, 
through July, 1914, a period considered satisfactory for relating 
agricultural prices to non-agricultural prices. Primarily directed at 
output control, the Act provided for: (1) the transfer of cotton owned 
by the Federal Farm Board and other agencies to the Secretary of Agri• 
culture; and (2) direct benefit payments to participating farmers in 
return for acreage cuts. The benefit payments, although coming ini• 
tia.lly from the Treasury, were to be recovered from taxes levied on 
the first domestic pro~esso~ of cotton. The control features were 
strengthened by th® Cotton Marketing and Control Act (popularly known 
as the Bankhead Act) which brought non•cooperators as well as coopera-
9 tors under the program. 
It became apparent within a matter of months~ however~ that 
enhancement of p;rkes through control of acreage would be a slow 
process and that immediate action was neededo On October 16, 1933, 
under the Presidemt us eme:i::·gency powers, the Commodity Credit Corporation 
{CCC) was established. lO As a wholly federally-owned corporation, 
chartered in Del~warev the purpose of the CCC was to carry out price 
Bu .. s.9 St;:at.utes at Large, XLVIIl, Public Law 10, 310 
9 U0So9 Statutes at La:ra_e, XLVIII, Public Law 169, 5980 
10 u.s .. 9 President 9 President vs Executive Order 9 No. 6340, October 
16~ 1933. 
22 
support and other agriculturally related operations under the 
direction of the Secretary of Agriculture. Its non-recourse commo• 
dity loans were essentially government purchase contracts. If the 
price of cotton went above the loan rate, the farmer could redeem the 
cotton, sell it, and benefit from the price advance. If the price of 
cotton declined below the loan rate, the CCC could not recover from 
the farmer and had to foreclose on the unredeemed cotton. The loan 
rate was therefore the support price. 
This program appeared to be having some success with the diffi· 
cult economic conditions. Th~ price of cotton rose from 7.29 cents 
per pound in 1932, to 13.25 cents per pound in 1936. Final success 
or failure, however, became an academic question early in 1936. On 
January 6, 1936, the Supreme Court's ruling in the Butler vs. 
the United States case11 invalidated as unconstitutional the control 
and tax features of both the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the 
Bankhead Act. As a result, Congress acted promptly to repeal the 
12 13 Bankhead Act and enacted special legislation to enable the 
Secretary of Agriculture to meet the obligations incurred under the 
Agriculture Act of 19330 
Interim Legislation 
The Supreme Court ruling temporarily disrupted plans of Congress 
11 
Butler v. ~' 56 S. Cto 312 (1936) 0 
12u .. s., Statutes at Large, XI.IX, Public Law 433 11 1106. 
13u s 
0 • ' 
Statutes at Large, XLIX, Public Law 440, 1108. 
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and farm organizations to establish an equitable relationship between 
commodity prices and the prices paid by farmers. The CCC continued 
the price support program through its non•recourse loans. 
On February 29 9 1936, Congress passed the Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act (SCDA Act) to provide for federal aid to 
14 
farmers. This Act may be considered technically as an amendment 
15 
to the Soil Erosion Act of 1935, an Act that provided for the pro• 
tection of land resources against soil erosion 11 but had somewhat 
different and broader objectiveso Generally speaking, th~ principle 
purpose was to enable the federal government to contintje acreage con• 
·trols and income payments to farmers without contradicting the re• 
s tr:i.c tions set out by the Supreme Court vs ruling on the AAA of 1933. 
The interest of the SCDA Act was to restrict the use of land 
for basic crops through sp@cific payments for adjustments to other 
uses. This was accomplished by substituting income parity for price 
parity and providing fo't' farmers to joi.n the prog'lt:'am on their own 
initi.ative and for their entire farms. 
The SCDA Act and the price support features of the CCC found 
little success, how~ver 9 with the e~isting situation. The 1937 
cotton crop was the largest ever produced in the u. s. and cotton 
prices dropped to an averag~ of 9 cents per pound. 
14u.s.~ Statutes at Large 9 XLIX, Public Law 461, 1148. 
l5u.s. 9 fil:.s:t;:ut.es at Largev XLIX, Public Law 46, 163. 
The Basic Foundation 
The Agriculture Act of 1938 
The Agriculture Act of 1938 was the first comprehensive legis• 
lation dealing with price supports. 16 It was enacted by Congress as 
a long-term program to aid agriculture, in contrast to the AAA of 
1933 which had been enacted as a short•term emergency measure. The 
program provided for the use of price supports and production control 
features. 
24 
When it appeared that certain major crops, such as cotton, might 
be in surplus, causing prices to drop close to or below the break-even 
point, the Secretary could take counter action. He could support 
prices by means of price suppor,ts alone through the CCC at not less 
than 52 percent nor more than 75 percent of parity when (1) the market 
price of middling 7/8 inch cotton was below 52 percent of parity on 
August 1, or at anytime thereafter during the marketing year, or 
(2) the August estimate was in excess of the normal year's domestic 
consumption and exports. Alternately, the Secretary might impose 
acreage allotments or marketing quotas, or a combination of either 
with price supports. In addition, the Secretary was authorized to 
make production payments, based on parity, to help make up the 
difference between the market price and the support price. 
The 1938 Act ma·rked the first official use of the word "parity". 
Like the SCDA Act of 1936, the Act referred to income parity and not 
l6u 0 S0 , Statutes at Large, LII, Public Law 430, 78. 
price parity. The legislation stated that "parity, as applied to 
income, shall be that per capita net income of individuals on farms 
from farming that bears to the per capita net income of individuals 
not on farms, the same ratio as prevailed during the period August, 
1909 to July, 1914on17 This equity ratio was easy to compute since 
it merely required comparing a present ratio· of per capita net income 
with a similar computational standard in the base years. 
The Act, plus amendments in 1938 and 1939, reversed the decline 
in agriculture prices but cotton remained in a depressed condition. 
For the 1938 crop, price~ averaged 63 percent of parity and a 3.0 
i' 
cent per pound parity payment was made to producers. The 1939 crop 
25 
prices averaged 66 percent of parity but through legislative amendment, 
parity payments were reduced to 1.6 cents per pound. 
Wartime Changes 
World War II changed the agriculture situation from one of 
acreage controls and price supports to one of encouraged production and 
price ceilings. In 1941, Congress passed legislation that: (1) directed 
the CCC to make loans available to cooperators on the 1941 crop at 85 
percent of parity, and to non•cooperators at 60 percent of the rate 
applicable to cooperators on that part of their crop subject to penalty 
18 
if marketed; (2) appropriated the funds for parity payments and 
authorized an adjustment in parity payments in rela~ion to farmersv 
17 Ibid 09 p. 79. 
18 
UoS., Statutes at Large» LV3 Part l» Public Law 74 9 203. 
19 
returns and parity prices; and (3) extended the period for which 
payments would be made at 85 percent of parity through the crop,year 
1946. 20 
21 
The Emergency Control Act, passed early in 1942, provided that 
no ceiling price on cotton could be established below the highest of: 
26 
(1) 110 percent of parity; (2) the prevailing market price of October 1, 
1941; (3) the prevailing market price on December 15, 1941; or (4) the 
average price of cotton between July 1, 1919, and June 30, 1929. The 
. 22 
Stabilization Act which followed in October, 1942, provided for loans 
to cotton cooperators at 90 p~rcent of parity for a period of two years 
from January l, following the declaration that hostilities had termi· 
nated. 
1 . . 23 
In June, 1944, special legislation raised the loan rate to 
-92.5 percent of parity. In addition, the CCC announced a cotton pur-
chase program under which purchases were made at parity. Even under 
these condition~~'increases in CCC stocks were slight. 
. . : . 
D~ring 1945 "1nd 1946 9 prices wete still supported at 92.5 percent 
0£
1
parity and tlie'c:cc continu~d to makepurchases at parity. 
less, carryover and CCC stocks of cotton declined. 
1 
19u s 
O O 9 ,Statutes at .Large, LV9 Part 1, Public 
20 u.s.' Statutes at Large, LV, Part 1, Public 
21 . u.s. p Statutes at .Large, LVI, Part 1, Public 










23 u.s.' Statutes at Large, LVIII, Part 1, Public Law 383, 632. 
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The wartime amendments for production incentives just modified and 
did not change the basic provisions of the Agriculture Act of 1938.. The 
Secretary of Agriculture retained discretionary power to support crop 
), 
prices and impose production limitations. As it turned out, mark!t 
prices in most cases were above support levels and government acquisi• 
.tions were slight to non-existent. With the tennination of war, Con• 
gress passed de-control legislation which was intended to enable the 
:relaxation of maximum price controls when the Secretary of Agrietilture 
determined the coinmod:1.ty no longer in short supply. 
"l 
Post•War Amendments and Legislation 
The high price supports of World War I.I were designed to increase 
supply to satisfy demands brought on by the war. They were originally 
planned to terminate two years after the official ehd of hostilities 
as declared by either the President or Congress. The President made 
such a.declara.tio!l24 on December 31, 1946, in which he stipulated that 
as of December 31, 1948, the authority of the CCC to dispose of cotton 
would be subject to the Act of 1938, and that its obligation to make 
cotton loans at 92.5 percent of parity would terminate. 
Agriculture, like other industries when the war terminated, faced 
li 
the possibility 9£ a sharp price decline brought on by a decrease in 
demand. To prevent this potential decline, farm leader.a and Congressmen 
worked on peacetime legislation which was passed before the President vs 
procla:µia.tion date deadline. Accordingly, in 1948, Congress extended 
24u.s., Statutes at Large, LXI, Part 2, Presidential Proclamation 
2714, 1049. 
25 
high price support programs with slight modification through 1949. 
In addition, other provisions of the Agriculture Act of 1948: 
(1) redefined parity; (2) provided a modern parity formula; and 
28 
(3) provided for a t~ansition parity price. The Act stated that parity, 
as applied to income, would be that gross income from agriculture that 
would provide the farm operator and his family with a standard of 
living equivalent to that afforded persons dependent upon other occu• 
pations. This definition was never implemented because of the diffi• 
culty in actual measurement and calculation. It depended upon the 
measurement of gross income 9 the determination of a parity gross 
income, and the measurement of different levels of living between farm 
and non-farm people. Alsop statistically, who and what should be inm 
eluded in "other o~cupations 11? Even though the new definition was 
never usedD the new formula and transition parity were incorporated 
26 
and further modifie.d by the Agr:l.culture Act of 1949. 
The Agriculture Act of 1949 classified agricultural commodit:i.es 
into four main g:roups for purposes of price support, namely P the bas:n.i:1;; 
conunoditiesi> spe~ial ~onnnodities, storable non-basic commodities,, and 
other non-basic (;Ommodi.tie!lll. Cotton was classified as a basic 
commodity. 
The Act also :raised the level of cotton p·rice supports to a 
range from 75 percent of ,parity if the total supply was 130 percent of 
25 u.s. P Statutes at Large 9 LX!I,, Part l 9 Public Law "897 l> 1248. 
26 U0 Soi> Statutes at Large, LXII1 9 Part 1,, Public Law 439,, 1051. 
normal supply 1 to 90 percent of parity if total supply was not more 
than 108 percent of normal. This provision for flexibility of 
supports was largely nullified, however, by an additional stipulation 
that the cotton ©~op would be supported (by non-recourse loans) at 
90 perciemt of parity in 1950, 80 to 90 percent in 1951, and 75 to 90 
percent thereafter. The ~~ct level was to be fixed by the Secretary 
of Agriculture in accordance with various factors including the size 
of surpluses. These supports were manditory except when marketing 
quotas had been reje~ted in a producer referendum. 
29 
Under the 1949 Act, parity was computed under the modern formula 
(including hired labor costs and wartime subsidies) taking into account 
changes in the market price of different farm goods in the ten preceding 
ye~rs. In addition~ th~ ~t stipulated that parity price was not to 
be less than the parity pd.ice a.s computed by the old formula until 
December 31, 1950. This.was known as the dual parity system. 
Oth®'lt' genieiira.l pzov:ii..sions of the Act were: (1) compU.ance with 
acreage allotments and marketing quotas could be required as a condition 
of price supporu; (2) supports could be increased_ to alleviate a 
short supply; and (3) all CCC loans were to be non-recourse. 
The Secretary was also directed to announce the level of price 
$Upports before the crop year began. This provision was extremely 
important to·· the sliding scale method of supports when surplu!!lles 
app~red; prior announcement of reduced price supports would pennit 
farmers to alter production. 
30 
The Decade of Conflict 
The main objective of cotton programs immediately following World 
War II was to stabilize farm prices and income. The future of such 
programs, however$ was hampered by a buildup of CCC stocks during 
1948 and 1949. Wit~ the onset of the Korean Conflict, there was a 
possibility of wartime increase in demand. Congress once again 
authorized price ceilings for agricultural commodities by enacting 
27 
the Defense Production Act of 1950. 
In accordance with administrative action taken because of the 
war situation, price supports were maintained at 90 percent of parity 
through 1951, and an amendment to the Defense Production Act28 set a 
ceiling at. not less than pa:dty price or 90 percent of the price on 
May 19, 19.51. ?rhis was ClOntinued in 1952 9 however, the question 
arose as to whether the di.ding scale should be permitted to come into 
29 
effect in 1953. A subsequent amendment, in 1952, continued loans 
at 90 pert<.ent of parity for 1953 and less than a month later, an 
amendment to the AAA of 1949 :siet the same level for both 1953 and 
19540 30 
As the Korean Conflict drew to a close, demand for cotton 
started to decline while production continued high. Market prices 
dropped and the government began acquiring heavy stocks. By the 
27uQsOl) Statutes at Lar~, LXIV, Part 1, Public Law 774, 798. 
28 u.s .. l) ptatutes et Lar__g_e 9 LXV, Public Law 96 9 131. 
29u.s. !) Stiffitytes at Larg_e 9 LXVI 9 Public Law 42.9i> 296. 
30u s 
• • I) Statutes at Large 9 LXVI 9 Public Law 585 9 758. 
fall of 1953, the supply conditions for cotton indicated a need for 
action on the part of the administration and Congress. The final 
31 version of the Agricultural Act of 1954 re-established a sliding 
scale for cotton ranging from 82.5 to 90 percent of parity in 1955 
and 75 to 90 percen~ thereafter. In addition, it was stipulated that 
transitional parity would begin January, 1956. The drop in parity 
price from the old to the new formula was limited to 5 percentage 
points per year, in order to prevent drastic drops in support prices 
as a result of formula changes. 
To further alleviate problems of the surpluses acquired under 
the price support program, Congress passed the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act, which, among other things, permi.tted 
32 
the sale of surplus stocks in foreign countries for local currency. 
31 
This is better known as Public Law 480 and is treated more extensively 
in Chapter V - Multiple Pricing Plans.· 
The cotton situation seemed to get. worse in 1955 when carryover 
reached a record high of 14.5 million bales and farm income continued 
to decline. In an effort to relieve the situation, Congress passed a 
resolution which called for the restoration of 90 percent of parity 
price supports. The President declared the legislation self-defeating 
and exercised his veto powero 
After a series of concessions, Congress passed and the President 
31uos., Statutes at Large, LXVIII, Part 1, Public Law 690, 897. 
32u.s., §tatutes at Large, LXVIII, Part 1, Public Law 480, 454. 
32 
33 
signed into law the Agricultural Act of 1956. Even though this 
Act's chief effect on cotton was through the provision related to sur• 
plus disposal, it also froze transitional parity for one year and put 
new emphasis on supporting prices through production adjustment. It 
provided for voluntary reduction of cotton acreage below that required 
by allotments through acreage and conservation reserve programs. This 
was the Soil Bank Program under which land was removed from production 
on short-term (one year) and semi-permanent (three to fifteen years) . 
bases. 
Marketing conditions continued to be hampered by excess supply 
through 1957. Price supports for cotton were 81 percent of parity and 
production controls were in effect. On January 16, 1958, the President, 
in his message to Congress, made a proposal for lowering supports to a 
scale of 60 to 90 percent of parity. Congress responded with a one• 
year freeze on price supports to prevent them from dropping below 
1957 levcels. The President promptly vetoed the measure. 
A compromise resulted in the enactment of the Agricultural Act of 
34 
1958. The Act embraced the new approach of treating each major crop 
separately. For cotton, each producer was given these choices: 
A. price supports at 80 percent of parity for 1959 and 75 percent of 
parity in 1960 by planting his regular acreage allotment; or B. price 
supports at 65 percent of parity in 1959, and 60 percent in 1960, if 
33n.s 
.II/Jo o, 
34uv ·s i.>e · o 9 
Statutes at Large, LXX, Part 1, Public Law 540, 188 • 
Statutes at Large, LXXIID Part 1, Public Law 85•835, 988. 
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he planted between 100 and 140 percent of his acreage allotment. Price 
supports to farmers who elected choice A were made through a purchase 
program, while non=recourse loans were used under choice B. After 
1960, price supports were to be determined by the Secretary of 
Agriculture within the following limits: for 1961, the level would 
be not less than 70 percent, and not more than 90 percent of parity; 
after 1961, the level could not be less than 65 percent nor more than 
90 percent of parity. (Table I) 
Recent Developments 
The 1950's had been a decade of administrative and legislative 
conflict with regard to agricultural programs. Price supports had 
declined from 124 percent of parity in 1950, to 77 percent of parity 
in 1960. Government costs 9 nevertheless, rose and surpluses were a 
continuous problem. 
Under the leadersh:i.p of a new administration, a new long .. range 
program was presented to Congress in 1961. The basic objective was to 
raise farmers' inco~es and preserve the smaller farmers while at the 
same time cutting·down federal acquisitions of surpluses. The techniq_u<!:l 
to achieve these ends was supply management• a stringent system of 
production controls and marketing quotas that would prevent surpluses 
from reaching the market. Congressional opposition, however 9 killed 
the proposal in committee. Particularly at issue was the technique 
for setting up a program for ~ach commodity and the increasing 
authority of the Se~ireta.ry of Agri~ultul.'e. The final outcome wailil the 
enactment of an omnibus farm bill complying with many of the Preililident 0 s 
minor requests to continue existing programs. 35 
The following year, the President again presented an overall 
farm program. This time, Congress partially responded with the 
enactment of the Agriculture Act of 1962. 36 Its major effect on 
price supports was in the form of supply adjustment. This was 
accomplished by the initiation of pilot programs for placing unneeded 
farmland in non-agricultural uses and providing loans and technical 
assistance to encourage recreational developments. 
Future attempts at major conunodity legislation found persisting 
resistance to manditory controls. Therefore, no cotton price support 
legislation was enacted until Congress, with the support of the 
administration 9 passed the Cotton and Wheat Act of 1964. 37 
The goal of the 1964 Act was to maintain the income of cotton 
producers, especially the small producers, while increasing the con• 
sumption of cotton. It provided for three price support levels. 
The producers who planted only their domestic allotments received the 
market price or the support loan purchase price plus a parity payment 
on the normal yield per acre established on the farm. Producers who 
planted their effective allotments were entitled to only the market 
price or the loan priceo Producers who signed up for export acreage 
34 
were entitled to the same loan price on all except the production ere~ 
dited to export acreageo Production on export acreage had to be sold 
35 u.s., .[tatutes at Large, LXXV, Part 111 Public Law 87-128, 2940 
36u s 
0 • l> Statutes at Large, LXXVI, Pa.rt 1 11 Public Law 87-703, 6050 
37u s .. ... , Statutes at Large, LXXVIII, Part 1, Public Law 88•261, 173. 
35 
on the world market without government assistance. 
In an attempt to make domestic mills competitive with foreign 
mills and do~estic producers competitive with foreign producers in the 
world market, the Act also authorized the Commodity Credit Corporation 
to carry out a program under which equalization payments were made to 
cotton handlers. A cotton handler, under this program, was any person 
or firm: (1) who was engaged in buying and selling cotton, exporting 
cotton, or domestically using cotton; and (2) who had entered into 
an agreement with the Commodity Credit Corporation. The payments 
were determined by the Secretary of Agriculture on the basis of the 
difference between domestic market prices and world. market prices of 
cotton. 
Since the 1964 Act was for only two years, Congress began during 
the next session trying to work out a more desirable long-range pro• 
gram. On November 3, 1965, the Food and Agriculture Act of 196538 
was signed into law. 
WHh regard to price supports, the new Act: 
1. Set price support loans to cooperators at not more than 
90 percent of the estimated world price (for 1966, 21 cents) 
on the actual production of cotton; 
2. Provided price support payments to cooperators who reduced 
their_.aereage to their domestic allotment and to small farmers 
with (a) an allotment of 10 acres or less, or (b) whose 
farm allotment times its projected yield was 3,600 pounds or 
38u.So 9 Statutes at Large, LXXIX 9 Public Law 89•321, 1187. 
less. This payment, when added to the loan rate, would 
reflect no less than 65 percent of parity for the projected 
yield of the permitted acreage and could not be less than 
9 cents a pound. 
36 
The·Act also discontinued equalization payments to domestic mills 
and, in essence, terminated parity as a direct basis for price supports. 
In addition, differential payments moved to the forefront as themajor 
price support mechanism. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRODUCTION CONTROL PROGRAMS 
Price support progr~ms alone could present a major danger of 
stimulating p:roduction ~nd 1&dding to government surpluses. Therefore 9 
additional measures hav@ b®en developed to facilitate adjustment and 
make price supports ®ffel(;:tive. 
The production control approach to handling the farm proble~ 
is based on eviclen.c® that the dremand for most Uo So farm goods is 
M.glhiJLy indasti.c:. 'I'his implies t:h$ilt a slight de~re&U:l® in malfk®t 
sn.1.pplies will c<11us® pdl(;:as to rise sufficiently to achieve price and 
net farm income targets. Cotton had long been hamp®red by highly 
va:dabl® supplies f'ft'@m y®&1lf to y@ar. P·:r.odu<ction icont:irob v icombinfld 
with a stoll:'ag® p1rog1t\~mv '5dt:tempted to keE2p suppliEts from r®aiching 
levels (ei.ther Mgh or sho:rtt:) that would cause sharp changes in 
prices .. 
The problem of farm surpluses initially became acute in the 
1920°s. It was filfst thought: that two solutions Wffi:llt'e possible: 
(]!.) o:iro1edy dist.ribut::ll!'m 9 and (2) prod:ui1:.tion controls.. With fanne:rs 
ac«:'oustomed to unlim:U::.\!:ld prodt·uc:tion~ it was only natural that orde11.t1.y 
38 
marketing was tried firsto However, when the operations of the Federal 
Farm Board resulted in heavy losses, pressure arose for a program to 
hold production in ~ine with quantities demanded at acceptable prices. 
The Agricultural Act of 1933 
Acreage allotment provisions were a part of the Agricultural Act 
of 1933. 39 Cotton producers signed contracts with the government to 
reduce acreage in return for benefit payments. These payments were 
financed by a tax of 4o2 cents a pound levied on the first domestic 
pro~essor of cotton and were designed to provide income relief while 
adjustment was being made. 
Cotton producers who did not sign contracts, however, were free 
to produce without restt·ictions. Therefore, cooperating produce:rs 
soon began asking for marketing quotas with a penalty tax to force 
non-cooperating producers into line. This was accomplished through 
the Cotton Marketing and Control Act40 (the Bankhead Act) which 
stipulated that ©otton ginned in excess of individual quotas was to 
be taxed at 50 perc1~mt of the average price of 7 /8 inch middling spot 
cotton on the 10 principal spot markets, but not less than 5 cents 
per pound. Small producers (up to 5 acres) were given tax exemption 
certificates covering their entire crop, and other growers received 
the same certi ffoates for their past performanceo 1:ax exemption 
39 u.s. 9 Statut~SJ at Large, XLVIII 9 Public Law 10, 31. 
40 u.s., §t:atutes a~v XLVII!~ Public Law 1699 598. 
39 
certificates, however, were not issued to persons not engaged in cotton 
41 
production before 1934. This measure was manditory for the 1934•35 
crop year but was to be extended for a second year if two•thirds of 
the cotton farmers, voting by referendum, expressed a desire for its 
continuance. 
When contracts were let early in 1934, farmers were limited to 
between 55 and 65 percent of their base acreage. (Table II) The 
base acreage was the average acres of cotton planted during the 1928-32 
period. On the land kept out of production, farmers received cash 
,,. 
rental payments of 3.5 cents per pound on the average yield of lint 
cotton per acre on their farms during the 1928•32 period, with a 
maximmrt;rental of $18 per acre. A parity payment of 1.0 cent per 
pound was made on the farm allotment (40 percent of the base acre~ge 
times the average yield per acre on this ~crea$e during the base 
period)·. Approximately 27 million acres of cotton were harvested, 
yielding 9.6 'million bales~ as compared with 29.4 million acres harQ 
vested and 13 million bales produced in 1933. The average farm price 
was 12.36 cents per pound. This more than doubled the 1931 price. 
Cqngress, on August 24, 1935, passed an Act42 whic~: (1) extended 
the Bankhead Act provisions for two additional years; (2) authorized 
the compulsory tax if approved by two•thirds of the voting producers; 
4lu s, 
.. .. • l) Statutes at Large, XLVIII, Public Resolution 45, 1184. 
42.__. s ' 







































COTTON MARKETING QUOTAS, ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS, AND 
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*Acreage in cultivation July 1, for the period 1929 thru 1943. 
*iiQuotas proclaim~d but data not a~ilable. 
Sources: Uo So, Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
1950-1965; and u. s .. ll Department of Agriculture, ERS, The Cotton 
Situation, 1933-1965. 
(3) reduced the states• minimum allotment level from 200,000 to 
80,000 bales; (4) set a minimum farm allotment of two bales; (5) set 
the maximum c.otton production for the 1935•36 season at 10 ,500 ,000 
bales; (6) authorized producers to transfer or assign certificates to 
others withiri the same state; and (7) authorized import restrictions 
on articles being imported into the United States in sufficient 
quantities to interfere with p~ograms undertaken under the 1933 Act 
or to reduce substantially the amount of any product processed from 
any commodity for.which a progi:-am was in operation. 
Butler vs. the Onited States 
The program was brought to a halt, however, in 1936, when in 
the case of Butler vs. the United States43 the Supreme Court ruled 
invalid» as unconstitutional, the control and tax features of the 
Agricultural .Act of 1933 and the Bankhead Act of 1934. As a·result, 
44 · 
Congress repealed the Bankhead Act on February 10, 1936, and 
enacted specfal l.egislation451 to provide 9 in part, for the Secretary 
41 
of Agriculture t9 meet all obligations and commitments incurred under 
provisions :of the Agricultural Act of 1933. 
The Interim 
The Supreme Court d~cision led to the enactment of the Soil 
43 Butler v • .Y,9 SM 56 s. Ct. 312 (1936). 
44 u.so~ Statutes at Large, XLIX 9 Publi~ Law 433, 1106. 
45 ,U.So, Statutes at la.r&,!l, XLIX, Public Law 440, 1108. 
42 
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act46 which shifted emphasis to 
soil conservation but retained the production control type machinery 
developed under the 1933 Act. Under the program, cotton was classified 
as a soil depleting crop and producers were assigned a base equal to 
their 1928•32 average acreage. 
In return for diverting acres from their base, cotton farmers 
received 5 cents per pound on the average yield that would have been 
harvested from the diverted acres up to 35 percent of the base acreage. 
Payments were also made on increasing the acreage of soil conserving 
cropso These payments were computed on the basis of the cotton acreage 
and acreage on open land, and could be earned only if cotton acreage 
was diverted from the base. Instead of acreage adjustment contracts 
as provided for under the Agricultmral Act of 1933, the SCDA kt called 
for the submission of ~onservation adjustment plans with payments 
being made on submiss:i.cm of proof that the plan had been carried out. 
Although the Act was an ai~ to better use of landt it was larg~ly 
impotent as an aid to continu~d production controls. The 1931 crop 
was the largest ever produced in the United States and the farm prices 
for cotton dropped to 8.41 cents per pound. 
The Basic Instrument 
. -
The foliowing year~ Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment 
.· 47 
Act (AAA) of 1938~ which provided for a dual attack on surplus 
43 
production. It retained the main features of the SCDA Act which 
called for payments to producers who diverted acreage from soil de• 
pleting crops and it authorized the imposition of marketing quotas and 
acreage allotments.· 
When the Secretary of Agriculture determined that the total supply 
(cotton carryover plus the estimated annual .. production) for the 
marketing year would exceed the normal supply (130 percent of the esti• 
mated domestic consumption and exports), he was authorized to proclaim 
a national cotton marketing quota. If the marketing quota was approved 
by two•thirds of the cotton producers, a national acreage allotment 
could be proclaimed for the next calendar year. The national allotment 
was then apportioned to individual farmers on the basis of their crop• 
land and cotton acreage during the preceding three years. 
Marketing qtll.otas for the individual farmers were computed from 
the larger of the normal yield or actual yield per acre of the farm's 
acreage allotment as app~~tioned from the national acreage allotment. 
The national acreage allotment was determined as that acreage 9 based 
on the national average yield per acre for the five preceding years» 
required to provide the national marketing quota. 
The Act was amended the same year (1938) to: (1) provide for 
establishing allotments for statesi, and for specific farms; (2) set the 
years to be used in determining normal yields; (3) set a 90 per©ent rate 
for special a~reage allotment of soil depleting crops;48 and (4) provide 
44 
for re•alloting 1938 unplanted allotments to other farms in the same 
county having inadequate or non .. representative allotments on the basis 
of past records. 49 
For the 1938 crop~ the national cotton acreage allotment was 
set at approximately 27o5 million acres. Due to the large carryover 
at the end of the 1937 crop year, the Secretary of Agriculture 
announced national and farm marketing quotas. Growers approved them 
by a large majority. It was believed that such quotas would be a 
strict device for controlling the supply of cotton because each pro-
ducer could not sell more than his authorized portion of the u. s. 
total without being charged a tax of 2 cents a pound. Individual 
producers~ howeverl) were allowed to compute their marketing quotas on 
the basis of the higher of either the normal yield or the actu~l 
production from his alloted acreage. Thusl) the entire crop produced 
on alloted acres could be marketed without penalty, and as a result 11 
the supply=c~ntrol featur~s of quotas T,;'V®re largely ineffective. 
- . 50 
In 1939 11 Congress amended the AAA of 1938 to: (1) include for 
subsequent years the provisions for reapportionment of cotton acreage 
allotments and minimum county allotments of acreage; and (2) provide 
minimum farm ac~eage allotments at not less than 50 percent of the 
1937 planted acreage plus diverted acreageo An additional amendment51 
extended a p~ovision for the reapportionment of cotton acreage not 
49 U0So 11 ~utes at La~ze,, I.!!~ Pu.bl:!.© Law 557 9 586. 
50 
UoSoll Statutes at ,)Large, l.111 11 Part 29 Public Law 149 11 8530 
Slu S 
0 .. :Fl Stjl,tµtes at Large 9 LIII 9 Part 2!) Publk Law 6 9 512Q 
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planted by entitled farmerso 
In attempts to improve the program in 1940, Congress provided: 
(1) new instructions and procedures for determining the normal yield 
of cotton on individual farms; 52 and (2) import restrictions on items 
that interfered with. Section 32 programs. 53 Congress also amended the 
SCDA Act by: (3) restricting payments or grants to landlords, under 
conditions of displaced tenants or sharecroppers, except when approved 
54 by local and state committees; and (4) providing for advances to 
producers for insurance premiums th~ough the Federal Crop Insurance 
• 55 Corporat1.on. 
l',he Post-War Situation 
During World War II 9 the emphasis was on increased production and 
surpluses were no problem; however, the authority to administer pro• 
duction control programs was s;ill effective. When the problem of 
port:ant in effcnr:ts to adjust output to demand. 
Quota and Allotment Adjustments 
Th~ Ag:dculture Act \OJf 194856 continued. the pre-war producti~n 
cont'!rol featurH, hli:l>w@wir 9 the Agriculture Act of 194957 classified 
52 
Statutes L.~~v LIV9 1, Public Law 879j) 12llo u .. so !) at P~rt 
s3u . · oS .. , §..tatut®S at L<;i.l'J!®j) LIV9 Part 1» Public Law 406, 11. 
54u s .. · 
0 ., Statutei!ll at ~ts!.» Y..IV9 Pa.lI:'t 1» Public Resolution 1 9 216. 
55u S· 
.. 0 l) Statutes at L<;1.rgei, LIV» Pal!:'t l» Public Law 716l) 727 0 
56 
u .. so 11 Statutes at Lar~9 LXII 9 Part 1 9 Public Law 897, 1248. 
57u s 
! 0 • " .§..tatutes at Lane 9 LXIII 9 Part 1 9 Public Law 439, 1051 
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cotton as a bask l(';Ommodity and stipulated that compliance with acreage 
allotments and marketing quotas could be required as a condition for 
prke supports. Additional legislation :in 1949: (1) established the 
minimum level for marketing quotas at not less than 10 million bales~ 
or one million bales less than the estimated domestic consumption plu,s 
exports of cotton for the marketing year ending in the calendar year 
in which such quota was proclaimed, whichever was smaller• provided 
that the national marketing quota for 1950 should not be less than the 
number of bales requllried to provide a national acreage allotment of 
21 million acres~8 and (2) eliminated the use of 1949 cotton acreage 
planted and yields in computing cotton acreage allotments for any 
59 subsequent year., 
Biefot>e thie 1949 l@g:itsla.t:i.on went into effect, Cong:r.iessmen began 
to rec(eive complainu t:ha.t 21 million a~res was too sharp a drop £:com 
the 27 million a©)teli! in 1949 and would me.an unduly depressed income for 
60 
((;:(Otton fairmt"lt'S. T!h<:':l ll:'\;liSlUl t w<!iis a sp@dl.al Cotton AU.otment Act, 
minimum a~:reage {65 peirlt;;ent: of the 19l~6-48 acreage or 45 pe:rcient. of 
the highest ae:reage in any one of the th:reei years) even if it was 
58.[(j! s 
-· 0 • ' Ste~I! Bit; La~, I.XIII~ Pall'.'t 1$ Pub Ure Law 27'2.' 670. 
59F S 
lLlfo o v ~.tatute&ll -~t L~r~~,, LXII.1 9 Pa1rt l~ PuJ:»lfo Law 289 17. 
lifted because of the Korean Confli.ct~ the Senate decided not to act 
on the bill. 
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Acreage allotments and marketing quotas were not reapplied during 
the Korean Conflict. As a result~ by 1953 9 the government was faced 
with the fastest ac~umulation of excess cotton in the history of the 
program. Marketing quotas wet·e proclaimed by the Secretary of 
Agriculture and a.pp:E:oved by referendum for cotton in 1954. 
'rhe pro«::lamation for the 1954 crop caused a Congressional disput.e 
between Southern and Western cotton produ~ers. The dispute involved 
two major factors~ (1) the size of the cut; and (2) the percentage 
decrease necessary in ea~h of the regions. Under the existing ~otton 
quota formulav &11, rc:\s:it. of applroximately 10 million a<1'.;res or about 37 
parlCent w~s nec:.@ssa.lr.y to avoid building -up additional surplus stocks. 
!.n addition 9 the cut wirruld it:ause the largest reduction in. acreage in the 
four Western st.ei.te$ wl:d.11;;h had experrience.d an upward tr~nd in ac:t"e.age. 
We1tern Cong:tiieltSmen Wiillnt@d a n®w fo:i::·mula for aUio<1;::at:ing i!!.lt;;lt"eag;a en1ch 
as a 1951 .. 53 pit(Oi:thll(G.tion bas~D and they wanted a guarantee that no 
staite would be cut min@ th.an 2.5 pe:r..c:ent below its 1952 ac:r.eage. 
A comp:romi&,J@ bU.1 fin~Uly emerg.ed and was ll\maiCted into law. 61 
Inst®ad of th(!!l 17. 5 mU.li(,ra ~!Cll'.'®5 s@t as thei national allotment fayr 
l 95l~ under th@ old la:w9 the new law pie;rmitted 2.1.4 mUlfon aie:r®s ~nd 
guaranteed that no stat® 0 s aec;reage w@uld go down more than 29.5 p®:iI'<C:®n.t 
below the 1952.. a~:i\~a.g@. The .fil1?51t pin:nridcm benefited the S©ut:h and 
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both provisions reduced the severity of adjustments in the individual 
Western stateso 
Later that yearj the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 195462 was 
passedo It continued to use 130 percent of domestic consumption plus 
exports as the normal supply and provided for the release and reappor• 
tionment of unused farm acreage allotments for the 1954 and 1955 
crops. These levels of production controls were evidently not set 
low enough since cotton @arryover reached a record high of 14.5 
million bales on August lj 1956 .. 
The Soil Bank 
63 The Agrkult·ure Act of 1956 was an attempt to induce farmers 
to voluntarily reduce cotton acreage below that required by allot• 
mentso Title I of the Ai:::t set up an annual fund of 1.2 billion 
dollars for the soil bank. ?he soil bank was composed of two parts: 
designed specifi~ally to redu©e cotton and other crop acr~age in 
cultivation on a t®mpor~ry basi$. To qualify for the acreage reserv~ 
payments in 1956v the ©@tton falrnler had to: (1) comply with all 
allotments established for crops on his f21nn; (2) designate the 
into an agreement with the Secretary of Agriculture not later than 
July 27, 1956; (4) not graze, cut for hay, or crop any of the land 
designated for the program, and (5) control noxious weeds on the 
designated acreage. 
If these general requirements were met, payments were earned by 
reducing the acreage below the allotment in one or more of the 
following ways: (1) under0 planting the cotton allotment or, for 
1956, certifying that the allotment was under-planted in anticipation 
of compliance with the 1956 acreage reserve or because of adverse 
weather; (2) not planting more than the cotton acreage allotment and 
then not harvesting part of the planted crop because of destruction 
by natural causes on or before August 31, 1956; or (3) plowing, or 
in~orporating into th® soil, or clipping, mowing, or cutting, 
thereby reducing acr~age of cotton within the allotment after May 27, 
and not later than August 31, 1956. 
The tnaJ!simum e©tton a.c:!:'eage that ©ould be placed in the acreage 
reserve was not to exceed one0 half the allotment or 10 acres, which0 
ever was larger» except that the reserved acreage was not to exceed 
the allotment. The minimum acreage that might be placed in reserve 
was 10 per~ent of the allotment or 2 a©res, whichever was larger. 
When the allotment was less than 2 acres, all of it could be plac~d 
in the reserve. 
Farmers participated on annual bases and were compensated 
through the issuan©e of negoti~ble certificates redeemable by the 
CCC. The payment earned was based on a rate of 15 cents per pound 
of lint. For under .. pl.anting the payment was appU.®d to the normal 
49 
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yield for the designated acres. For mowing, plowing, cutting or 
incorporating into the soil, the payment was applied to the smaller 
of the appraised yield for the field or the normal yield for the farm, 
but not less than $6 per acre. 
In determining future allotments, acreage placed in reserve 
was credited to the farm as though such had actually been devoted 
to cotton production. 
The Conservation Reserve• This feature of the program was 
designed to remove acreage from crop production on a semi-permanent 
basis (three to fifteen years). Production of cotton was to be cut 
back by shifting cotton acreage into long•term conservation uses. 
In return for meeting the requirements of the cons~rvation reserve, 
the producer re©eived: (1) part of tb.e cost of estabU.shing the 
conservation pract.i~~; and (2) an annual payment for the term of the 
contract, approx:lmately iequivalent to the rental value of the'land 
pl~1Ced in the conise:ic·vation it®!ll1errve. 
Other p~oducti~n ~ontrol provisions of the Act affecting cotton 
included: (1) a freeze on the 1957 and 1958 national acreage allot 0 
m~nts at not less than the 1956 allotments; (2) a one percent limit 
on any state acreage allotment cuts in 1957 and 1958; and (3) a 
special 100 9 000 acre national acreage reserve to be added to the 
allotments of small farmers. These provisions temporarily blocked 
scheduled acreage cutbacks. 
The acreage reserV® portion of the 1956 Act was to run only 
three years. Nevertheless, it appe~red relatively effective in 
reducing cotton production. Total production decreased from 14.7 
51 
million bales in 1955, to 13.3 million in 1956, 11.0 million in 1957, 
and 11.5 million bales in 1958. Total allotment acreage in the re• 
serve increased from 1.1 million acres in 1956, to 3.0 million in 
1957, and 4.9 million acres in 1958. A large portion of cotton 
producers participated in the program: 32 percent in 1957, and 42 per• 
cent in 1958. 64 
Flexible Allotments 
In an attempt to further alleviate the surplus problem, the 
Agricultural Act of 195865 provided for moderate cuts in acreage allot• 
ments and gave additional authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to 
reduce the price supports in future years. Under the new approach of 
treating each crop separately, cotton producers were given a choice 
between: (1) regular a~zeage allotment and price supports at 80 percent 
of parity for 1959, and 75 percent in 1960; or (2) an increase of up 
to 40 percent over the regular acreage allotment with price supports 
of 65 percent in 1960. After 1960, farmers were to receive only their 
regular acreage allotments. 
In addition, the Act provided: (1) that national marketing 
quotas for any year would not be below the larger of the estimated 
domestic consumption and exports less one million bales or a total of 
ten million bales; (2) that a four•year average yield instead of a 
64u.s., Department of Agriculture, ERS 11 Economic Effects of 
i_\.creage Control Pirograms in tb.e 19SO's, Agricultural Economic Report 
No. 18 (Wa~hingt:on: 0(:tober, 1962), 9. 
65 U0 S., g_atutes at Large, LXXII, :Pa.r.~ 1, Public Law 85-835, 988. 
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five-year average yield would be used in converting the national 
marketing quota to a national acreage allotment; (3) that the minimum 
national acreage allotment would be 16 million acres; and (4) that any 
cotton acreage surrendered would be retained in the county so long as 
any farmer in the county desired additional cotton acreage. 
Other laws enacted that year: (1) authorized the Department of 
Agriculture to issue o,fficial estimates of acreage planted to cotton, 
instead of acres of cotton in cultivation on July 1, and to remove the 
66 prohibition against reports on farmers' intentions to plant cotton; 
(2) permitted the Se©r®tary to authorize cotton growers who had been 
unable to plant their cotton because of abnormal weather conditions to 
move such allotments for 1958 to another farm in the same or in an ad• 
67 
joining county; (3) a:uthoriz~d! th~ Secretary of Agriculture to com• 
pensate producere for ha~dships suffered under the 1956 Soil Bank 
Program as a result of incorrect information furnished by county commit• 
. ' 
te~:s; 68 (4) e:x:t:ended the authio,ir1ty of the Secre;tary of Agricultur® to 
69 administer the ag:ricultu:ieal conservation program through 1962. 
In 1959 9 Congress enacted legislation to: (1) preserve acreage 
allotment histories; 70 and (2) compensate producers on soil bank 
contracts based on erroneous information. n The administration pro-
66u s 
o • II .§J.:atu_te~ at=Lar~ 9 LXXII,, Pair:t ll) Public Law 85 ... 430, 149. 
67u .. s.ll fil:a.tut~s at 1&eirze, LX.'ll:!1 11 Part 1, Public Jr.aw 85 ... 456 9 186. 
68-aoSo II ~~-~J. ~'.'t'~tl!l) Ll!X)IJ:l) Part l, Publi@ Ia.w 85.,.4131) 118. 
69u.s .. ll §tetut:G!ls a.t. 1&~~9 Jf.JOf,::l'.I l) Part 11) PubU.e Y.W 85•.Si.53 9 414. 
70u s .... 
'0 .. ' 
Stat1U1tes at ta,rge 9 1.xx:r:n!) Part 11) Public law 86-1721) 393. 
71u s o · o II St .. a.tu t®S at la~11 LXXUI, P.!iJ..l't 1, Public I.aw 86 ... 2651) 552 .. 
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claimed marketing quotas as in previous years but reduced the national 
acreage allotment to a low of 16 million acres. For 1956, 1957, and 
1958, the national acreage allotment had been frozen at 17.4 million 
acres. 
Recent Developments 
Even though the programs of 1956 and 1958 seemed to be bringing 
production iri line with demand, their effectiveness was questioned. 
The programs were more costly than had been expected and CCC stocks 
were still in excess. 
All attempts to enact major legislation in 1960 met defeat. 
-
Nevertheless, minor legislation relative to cotton provided a uniform 
law for the transfer of acreage allotments to new farms when a farm 
was taken by ''a public agency having the power of eminent domain 72 and 
gave protection to acreage allotments while extending the conservation 
73 reserve program. 
The Secretary of Agriculture proclaimed a marketing quota of 14 
million bales for 1960 and again set the national acreage allotment 
at 16 million acres. Production response was approximately 14.2 
million bales. Total utilization was approximately 15 million bales 
and carryover decreased slightly to 7.1 million bales. This was the 
first year, however, that cotton textile imports ex~eeded exports. 
72 u.s., §tai:utes at Large, LXXIV, Part 1, Publk Law 86·423, 41. 
7Ju.,s.,, Statutes at Large, LXXIV, Part 1, Public Law 86°793, 1030. 
In 1961, the new administration launched a campaign to enact a 
new longarange production control program. The basic objective was 
to set up a stringent system of manditory allotments and production 
quotas {based on bales) that would prevent surpluses from reaching 
the market. Congressional operations~ however, kill~d the program 
in cormnittee. Legislation was passed 9 nevertheless 9 that permitted 
the 1961 prpducers with flooded out cotton acreage to transfer all 
or part of the acreage allotment» with permission of the county 
connnittee, to another farm in the same or adjoining eounty operated 
74 
by the same farmer 9 and enabled temporary release and reapportiona 
ment of pooled acreage allotments on land acquired by agencies having 
75 
the right of eminent domain. 
A marketing quota of 16 million bales was in effect for 1961 9 
and the national acreage allotment was increased to 18.5 million 
acres. The increase was due to special acreage authorization and 
54 
the allocation of 60 9 000 acres from the national reserve. Even though 
production was lower than expected, cotton carryover increased to 7.8 
million bales. 
The following year 9 the administration proposed legislation with 
strong production control features plus a new program of land convei 0 
sion. Congress partially responded with the enactment of the Agri• 
culture Act of 196276 which omitted the control features but enabled 
74 
U~So 9 Statutes at Large 9 LXXV9 Part 1, Public Law 87"'.379 84. 
7SuoSop Statutes at lal'.&._~9 LXXV9 Part 19 Public Law a7 ... 3.39 780 
76 u .. so !) ·~_tatutes ~~t 4\lr_g_e 9 LXXVI» Part l, Publi.c La·~ 37.,.7039 605. 
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the initiation of pilot programs for placing unneeded farmland in 
non-agricultural uses. It also amended and extended provisions 
enacted in 1961. 
'I 
Tlle nijw program was similar to the Soil Bank Conservation Reserve. 
It provided for: (1) longQterm (up to 10 years) federal contracts 
with farmers for diversion of cropland to recreational and conser0 
vational uses; (2) federal technical aid and 30-year loans to local 
governments for broad lt'ural renewal projects; (3) federal assumption 
of one•half the cost of developing recreational facilities at small 
watershed projects, and inclusion of recreational development and 
fish•farming among the purposes for which farmers might reGeive 
operating and real ... estate loans; (4) indusion of shifts of cropland 
to recreational uses~ timber~ etc. 9 among the purposes for which 
Carryover of ~ottcm contim.iied to rbe and, with rrespect to 
Agriculture 9 in an attempt to halt the rate of in~rease in textil~ 
imports, requested th~t an equalization fee be put on the cotton 
content of textile imports. On September 6 9 1962, the Tariff 
Commission rejected the proposal by a vote of 3 to 2. 17 
Conditions had r~ached such magnitude by 1963 9 that the admini 0 
stration .altered iU1 position and proposed a more flexible t:1;ro.,.year 
prog,tam with the aim of modifying the trends in produ@tion and 
utilization of cotton. In addition to subsidizing domesti~ mills 9 
the proposal suggested flexible allotments permitting cotton farmers 
to over-plant their regular acreage allotment by up to 20 percent, 
producing only their regular allotment or producing their domestic 
allotment (65 percent of their regular allotment) with support pay• 
ment rates varying directly with the level of acreage restriction 
sele~ted by the producer. Congress enacted such a program on April 
lll) 19640 78 
Because of the lack of agreement among different cotton pro 0 
ducing and processing groups~ the cotton portion of the Act was to 
run only two years. In essence~ Congress and interested groups @on° 
56 
tinued to search flQlr a molt'® ac@eptable long ... :range program tot.op® with 
- 79 
the probliems of U., So cotton. The F\Olod and Agrfoultmr® Act of 1965 
embodied an attempt at this endeavor. 
tinued flexible allotments 9 provid@d for acre~ge div~rsion payments 9 
2. Produ@ers could divert up to 35 perG@nt of the allotments 
78 
U;,S,q1 SJ;atµ,t_e:g, at Ia,a~~ LXX~IPT~ Publl~ I.Elw 88 .. 261 9 113 0 • 
79U,So » Statutes at Larg®, l.XX!X 9 Publfo Lii,rw 89-321 9 1181. 
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less than 25 percent of parity on the projected yield of 
the acreage dive:rtedo DivieHion to domestic allotment hnrd 
would :receive one level of payment while .additional diversion 
would receive another. The latter could not be more than 
40 percent of parity for the projected yield of the acreage 
diverted; 
3. Producers could choose not to plant theix· allotment and 
become eligible for diversion payments on 12~ percent of 
their farm allotment. The balance of the allotment could 
be released for reapportionment; 
4. Producers could sell or lease their cotton allotments to 
farmers in that county and, if approved by faitmer referendum, 
to farm®rs in th~t !lltate; 
5. Producers could exchange cotton and rice allotments within 
a county or adjoining counties under terms and conditions 
designated by the Secret:acy of Agritcultuice;; and 
6. Produ1Cers~ und®ir: th(5 C:rop1Land Adjustment P:rovisionii e@uli:lt 
retire land firom production on five 0 to ten°y®,1ll.it c:iontlfal©:t.s. 
The 1965 Arct definitely moclifi(!Iid the piroduction. con.tir©]. sy!llt®m 
for Ue s. ciotton. vilh®th.(!Iiir it will prove :sufficient to bring ©otton 
production in line with the statied objeictivta'ls r11:miain® to b@ d@t.e1t:1srlin.@rdl 
by the economic forces of 1966 and futu~e years. 
CHAPTER V 
MULTIPLE PRICING PLANS 
The use of price supports and production controls have been 
only a part of the overall program designed to improve farm incomes 
or increase income~ to a level comparable with that enjoyed by 
other groups with comparable resources. A significant element in 
the program has been the use of multiple pricing plans. 
Multiple pricing plans are used primarily to increase the sale 
and distribution of given commodities and products. As reviewed 
in Chapter II, the increased sales could result in increased pro• 
ducer incomes, fewer restrictions on agricultural production, and a 
reduction in the quantities owned and controlled by government from 
price supporting programs. Without doubt, some of these potential 
effects have been realized oV®r time. 
In past years, multiple pricing plans in agriculture coV®red 
two basically different types of a.ctivities. The first type 
consisted of finding ways to dispose of surplus commodities acquired 
by the government under price support operations. The major tech0 
niques were: (1) sales for dollars (usually at a loss); (2) out0 
right donations to the needy at home and abroad; and (3) barter 
for strategic and other needed materials. Dollar sales have been, 
by far, the mo.st important:. 
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The second type was designed to increase the distribution of 
commodities before they were acquired by the governmento The usual 
techniques were: (1) government•financed direct purchases of 
commodities to be donated to domestic institutions or sold overseas 
for foreign currency which was spendable only in that country; 
(2) export subsidies through payment 0 in-kind agreements with ex0 
porters. 
In recent years, howev®r 9 a third dimension has been addedo 
Producers have been giv®n the alternative of producing for export 
on special export acreageo When this alternative was selected, 
the producer was required to export the production from export 
acreage at world market prices without any assistance from the 
government. 
From a long~range point of view, all the export programs have 
similar effectso All attempt to divert additional quantities to 
the more elastic demands of secondary markets 9 and all attempt to 
achieve increased utilization of agricultural products. The eff®~ts 
on costs to the government and on returns to fanners, however, dep 
pend on the mechanism used in each case. 
During the 1920as 9 considerable interest was generated among 
agricultural leaders concelt'ning the possibilities of using multiple 
pricing plans to decrease surplus®s and increase returns to producers 
of agricultural commodities. The M©Nary-Haugen Bills considered by 




The central idea of this approach was that the domestic or 
United States price for a connnodity was to be pegged at a 11 fab:" 
level, and all that could not be sold at this price was to be pur• 
chased by a government export corporation. The corporation was to 
sell this excess abroad at world market prices. To protect domesti~ 
markets from foreign imports, tariffs on imports were to approximate 
the difference between the pegged domestic price and the world price. 
The difference between the supported domestic price and the world 
price for a commodity was to be shared equally by the producers of 
that commodity. 
The McNary•Baugen Bills of 1927 and 1928 passed both houses of 
Congress but ~re vetoed by the President. Even though they never 
became law, the Bills were an early attempt to guarantee farmers 
a fair price, and they contained the idea of selling at different 
prices in the domestic and foreign markets. The E:!t:port Debenture Pl~n 
also introduced during this period ©Onta~ned the features of multipl~ 
pricing. 
The economic conditions of the early 1930 9 s resulted in the 
failure of the Federal Fann Board and brought on excess supply and 
low income for cotton as well as other agricultural commodities. 
Multiple pricing was made an integral part of the Agricultural Act 
80 
of 1933. The Act: (1) gave processing and marketing firms 
80 u.s., Statutes at Lar__g~8 XLVIII, Public Law 10, 31. 
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permission to organize to exercise a centralized control over mar• 
keting of agricultural products; and (2) authorized the Secretary of 
Agriculture to (a) license distributors to eliminate unfair trading 
practices, and (b) dispose of com:nodities acquired under price support 
programs. 
81 
The National Industrial Recovery Act later that year amended 
the Agricultural Act of 1933 by modifying and restating the provisions 
relative to the disposal of cotton. On October 4, 1933, the Federal 
Surplus Commodity Corporation was .. created by the President under 
authority delegated by this Act, and on October 16, 1933, the Commodity 
Credit Corporation was created by executive order under the President's 
82 emergency powers. The purpose of the Federal Surplus Commodity 
Corporation was to absorb surpluses in agricultural products and 
distribu~e them to alternative uses and to destitute people. The CCC 
was empowered by its charter to engage in buying, sellin&, lending, 
and other activities concerning agricultural commodities, products, 
and related facilities. 
· 83 
In 1935 9 legislation wiui passed which: (1) replaced the 
licensing provision with marketing orders; and (2) ea.marked 30 peircent 
of u. s. Customs receipts from all sour~es each year to be used pri• 
marily by the Federal Surplus Commodity Corporation to encourage exa 
portation and domestic ~onsumption of agricultural commodities. The 
81u;;s., Statutes at Large, XLV!I 9 Public Law 67, 195. 
82..~ s . -u •.• , 
16, 1933. 
83u.s.,, Statutes at Large, XLIX, Public Law 320, 750. 
latter has become known popularly as Section 32 funds. These funds 
were to be used by the Secretary of Agriculture to: 
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1. Encourage the exportation of agricultural commodities and 
their products by (a) the payment of benefits in connection 
with their exportation, (b) payment of indemnities for loss@s 
incurred in connection with such exportation, or (c) payments 
to producers in connection with the production of that part 
of any agricultural commodity required for domestic con• 
sumption; 
2. Encourage the domestic consumption of agricultural commodities 
or products by (a) diverting them from the nornml chann®ls of 
trade and commerce 9 or (b) increasing their utilization among 
persons in low-income groups as 4etennined by the S@((!!'®t.ary; 
and 
3. Re.,,,establi&¥h fomenv purchasing pow®r by making payments in 
connection with the normal production of any agri~ultur~l 
commodity for domestic consumption. 
Under this pt'ogram 9 div~rirsion programs have been unde:t't,-aken to 
encourage the us® of suit'plus comm©dities in a diffor\!:mt way than would 
occur without the program. For example, cot.ton has beien us<1zd for a.n 
insulation material undeir a special Sect.ion 32 prog'!'.!llm. In additi«:m, 
exports have been encouraged through the payment of subsidies to 
commercial exporters. The exporter buys the commodity at the !ll:a.1l'.'ket 
price but he is able to sell to his overseas customers at. the comp®t.ia 
tive world pri~e. After exporting through regular tirade channels 9 h® 
rerceives a supplementary payment from Section 32 funds. 
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The Supreme Court's decision in Butler vs. the United States Case 
resulted in the repeal of the multiple pricing features of the Agri• 
culture Act of 1933. These provisions were re ... enacteid in the Agricul-
tural Marketing Act of 193785 but were no longer applicable to cotton. 
Therefore 9 the authority of the CCC and Section 32 provided the only 
mechanism for multiple pricing of u. s. cotton. 
In 1937, Congress: (1) co.ntinued the Federal Surptus Commodity 
86 
Corporation as a United States agency until June 30, 1945; and 
(2) authorized the use of Section 32 funds in the purchase and dis 0 
87 
tribution of surplus agricultural commodities for relief purposes. 
The language of the latter amendment was so broad that Section 32 be• 
came a catch•all authority and was the major source of export supsidies 
and donations to the needy during the remainder of the 1930 1s. 
88 
The Agriculture Act of 1938 extended both the provisions of 
Section 32 and the the Secretary of Agriculture 9s general authority 
to dispose of cotton acquired under price support operations by m~ns 
89 
of dollar saieso In 1939 9 the CCC was transferred to the U.;; s. 
90 
Department of Agriculture and Public Law 149 authorized the use of 
Section 32 funds for encou~aging a wider use of surplus commodities 
84Butl~r Vo United States, 56 s. Ct. 312 (1936). 
ssu•s.,i 
• 0 Ill Statutes .. at t,arg~11 L, Part 111 Public Law 137 11 246. 
86 u.s .. , Statutes at La~e, Lt Part 1, Public Law 165, 3230 
87 u.so, Statutes at La.r&Et1> L» Part ll) Public Law 385, 3230 
88u s, 
O Gp Statutes at Large 9 LII 0 Public Law 430 l} 780 
89 u.so, Statutes at L!..rge, LIII 11 Part 2. l> Public Resolution 209 813. 
90u s . 
o o II Statutes at La:rge 11 LI!I 11 Part 211 Publfo Law 1491) 939. 
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among persons of low income. In 1940 11 limited quantities of cotton 
goods were distributed through the. Stamp Plan and Cotton Mattress 
programs. 
During World War II, surpluses of cotton were small or nona 
existent. Nevertheless, between one•half and one million bales of 
cotton were distributed to Lend•Lease countries and through the United 
National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. (Table III) 
PostaWar Developments 
Since the .close of World War II, the base of multiple pricing 
plans has broadened and expanded rapidly. Plans involving cotton have 
concentrated primarily on export channels; nevertheless, some potential 
has been realized in the domestic market. 
In the early post""War years, there were several foreign aid 
programs, such as the United National Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, The Army Civilian Relief, and the European Recovery 
Program which procurred and distributed cotton and other products to 
needy foreign countries. It was not until 1948, however!) that a pro 0 
vision91 was ,na@tied.·.which 'it'~q_uired that farm goods be purchased from 
the u. s~·; when practical and when such goods were in surplus. 
92 
The Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948 authorized 
the CCC to sell surplus agricultural commodities to foreign governments 
91u~s., Statutes at LarM,, LXII, Part 1, Public Law 820, 1098. 
92u.s., Statutes at Large~» LXII, Part l, Public Law 897, 1248. 
TABLE III 
COTTON EXPORTS BY PROGRAMS, 1938-64 
Programs 
Year Beg. Level Army Civilian National Se- Exp. - Imp. P.L. 480 Program Cash Total 
July l UNRRA Lease Relief curity Act Bank Tit, I,II.,IV Barter Totals Sales Exports 
(Million .bales) 
1938 - - - - - - - - 3.605 
1939 - - - - - - - - 6.471 
1940 - - - - - - - - 1. 253 
1941 - .739 - - - - - .739 .463 
1942 - .865 - - - - - .865 .460 
1943 - .sos - - - - - .805 .535 
1944 .055 .892 - - - - - .937 .804 
1945 * * - - - - - * * 1946 .330 .026 - - - - - .356 3.579 
1947 - - .071 - - - - .071 1.885 
1948 - - .133 2.5 - - - 2.633 2.252 
1949 - - .114 3.4 - - - 3.514 2.442 
1950 - - .144 1.8 - - - 1.944 2.483 
1951 - - .052 .8 - - - .852 4.842 
1952 - - .033 1.1 - - - 1.133 1.977 
1953 - - .011 1.0 - - - l.Oll 2.787 
1954 - - - 1.2 .3 .1 ** 1.600 2.160 
1955 - - - .7 .4 .s .1 1.700 .541 
1956 - - - .9 .4 1.4 1.0 3.700 3.919 
1957 - - - .7 .8 .9 .s 2.900 3.011 
1958 - - - .8 .4 .6 .4 2.200 1.046 
· 1959 - - - .4 .3 .7 .1 1.500 5.333 
1960 - - - .3 .3 1.3 .1 2.000 5.238 
1961 - - - .1 .4 1.2 ** 1.700 5.538 
1962 - - - ** .9 1.2 ** 2.100 1.619 
1963 - - - - .s .9 .2 1.600 3.643 
1964 - - - - .s .8 .4 1.700 .2.936 
*Not shown because of inconsistent data 
**Below 50,000 bales. 
Sources: U. S., Department of Agriculture, ERS, The Cotton Situation, 1933-1965; and u. s., Department of 






























and to domestic, foreign, or international relief and rehabilitation 
agencies, or to barter them for strategic and critical materials pro• 
t,; l 
duced abroad. The Agricultural Act of 194993 amended Section 32 
making it primarily a flexible authority to prevent price collapses 
for non-price supported crops. The Act, nevertheless, extended the 
authority of the CCC to include prevention of waste and provision of 
assistance in distressed areas. The law also stated that the CCC 
66 
could not sell any basic agricultural commodity or storable non-basic 
commodity at less than 5 percent above the current price,·support level 
for the connnodity plus reasonable carrying charges. This restriction, 
however, did not apply to: (1) sales for new or by-products uses; 
(2) sales of oilseed for extraction of oil; (3) sales for feed or 
seed if such would not substantially impair any price support program; 
(4) sales for secondary uses; and (5) sales- for export. The CCC 
therebr became a major factor in the multiple pricing of cotton_-: ;J-
I~ 1951, the,eoneept of the European'Recovery Program was~-
panded to includenon .. European countries. This program plus u. S~ 
techni~al assistance 9 mutUci!l military defense and defense support 
94 95 were combined in the Mutual Security Act.· An amendment to thi~ 
Act in 1953 earmarked the first specific amou~t· of foreign aid futids 
- for pu.rehase of u. s. surplus fa.rm goods., 
) 
9 3tJ ~''S ~', Statutes at Large~ I.XIII, Part l, Publfo Law 439, 10510 
94u s ,, 
' .• .. Statutes at Large, LXV, Public Law 165 11 373. 
9Su.·si, Statutes at tar&!, LXVII 11 Public Law 118, 152. 
This type of multiple pricing was greatly broadened by the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act in 1954. 96 The 
law was a culmination of several different tendencies already evident 
in U.'' S;"' farm and foreign policy. . It was designed to stimulate the 
export and consumption of agricultural connnodities as a means of re• 
ducing surpluses. Major provisions affecting cotton included: 
Title I• Sales for Foreign Currencies. This authorized the 
67 
CCC to finance the sale of surplus commodities for soft currencies 
over a three~year period ending June 30, 1957. The actual movement of 
the commodities operated through private merchs.nts 9 exactly the same 
as under the special ea:nnarking provisions of the 1953 Mutual Security 
Act 9 except that it was financed by CCC funds later reimbursed by the 
Treasury. Foreign currencies accruing under the Act were used pri• 
marily to finance Uo s. military and civil personnel and to provide 
economic development loans to the nations involvedo In addition~ it 
set up a supplem®nt~l stockpile and designated th.at funds generated 
by tbis--Title be used to purchase strategic materials for the U~ s. 
Title II• Donations. This Title extended, for three years 9 
the President's authority to donate CCC goods to relieve famine and 
urgent food needs of friendly nations or people, even if their govern° 
ments were unfriendly. 
By the end of the 1955 crop year, cotton carryover had reached 
practically unmanageable proportions and demanded immediate legislation. 
68, 
97 
The Agricultural Act of 1956: (1) permitted the CCC to pay ocean 
freight costs for overseas shipments under Title II; (2) authorized 
appointment of a surplus disposal administrator within the u. s. 
Department of Agriculture to coordinate Public Law 480 activities; and 
(3) opened the supplemental stockpile to all barter materials. In 
addition~ the Act made important changes in the law governing export 
sales of cotton. 
The Secretary of Agriculture was directed to use existing powers 
and aut~ori-ties (primarily under the CCC charter as amended) to encourage 
the export of cotton by making it available at prices not in excess of 
the level of prices being offered by other exporting countries. The 
purpose of this provision was to prohibit the Secretary from placing 
a floor under the price at.which cotton could be sold abroad. 
The CCC fulfiHed the intent of the Act by: (1) making cotton 
available at competitive pri@es; and (2) providing an export subsidy 
sufficient to make cotton competitive in world markets. The effect 
was an immediate inc:reasei in U~ s. cotton exports. (Table III) Total 
cotton exports increased from 2,241 million bales in 1955 to 7,619 
million bales in 1956. Cash sales rose from one•half million bal~s 
to almost 4 million in the same period. 
98 
The following yearl) Public Law 480 was extended and up to 25 
percent of the local currencies acquired under Title I was earmarked 
97u0S~\. Statutes at Large, LXX, Part 1, Public Law 540, 188. 
98u.s~··, Statutes at La~ll LXXI, Part 1, Public Law 85·266, 592. 
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for loans to Ui s. or foreign firms to promote expanded markets for 
American products abroad. In addition, the President was given the 
power to authorize barter transactions with the Soviet satellite 
nations. 
In 1958, Public Law 48099 was again extended and the United States 
Department of Agriculture was forced to abolish the requirement that 
barter traders obtain a certificate of additionality from importing 
countries guaranteeing that the barter transaction was not replacing 
cash purchases. The certificate requirement had been imposed following 
charges that barter traders were invading commercial inarkets of U~ s. 
allies, such as Canada, Italy 9 Australia, and the Netherlands. 
Recent Developments 
Title IV was added to the Agriculture Trade Development and 
100 
Assistance Act in 1959 and authorized long•term dollar credits at 
low interest rates for the purchase of surplus fa.rm goods by under ... 
101 
developed nations. Th.is Title was a.mended in 1962 to authorize 
dollar credit.export sfl®s agreements with foreign and u. s. private 
tra?e firms, banks» and oth~r financial institutions acting in behalf 
of governments. 
The Agriculture Act of 1964102 added a new dimension to the 
. I 
99u~is~ ll Statutes at Large, LXXII, Part 1, Public Law 85•931, 17900 
I ,:! 
lOOu '·S •.• 9 Statutes at Large, LXXIII, Part 1, Public Law 86•341, 606. 
101u ·s ,, 
' • • 11 Statutes at targ!h LXXVI, Part 1, Public Law 87•703, 605. 
102u~·is;4, Statutes at Large, LXXVIII 11 Part 1, Public Law 88 ... 261 11 173. 
multiple pricing programs of cotton. For the first time, producers 
were allowed to plant excess acreage on the condition that it be 
exported without the benefit of price supports or other government 
programso In addition, the CCC was authorized to make equalization 
payments to cotton handlers in an attempt to stimulate domestic uses 
and reduce cotton acquisitions by the government. The payment was 
made in CCC sight drafts of PIK certificates. 
The 1964 program ~~1 en~cted for only two years, therefore, 
new legislation was n~eded in 1965. On November 3, of that year~ 
Congress passed the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965~03 With regard 
to multiple pricing fe~tures, the Act discontinued export subsidies 
and equalization payments but continued the provi$ion which enabled 
10 
cotton farmers to export cotton produc~d on export acreage without the 
plus recent expansion in Public Ia:w L~so~ indicate a definite tr<end 
toward greater us~ of multipl~ pricing plans in price and p~~duction 
programs for u. s.' cotton. 
103u ,'S,: s T ~ T vv1~··-. • ·~ tatut~s 1t ~rge, ~ A~ Part li> Public Law 89··32:1!., 
1187. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCL'UJS:IONS 
Through the years 9 ther~ has been increased government partiQ 
cipation in the production ~nd pricing of u .. s .. cotton. Major legis-
lation to this effect has b®en passed in practically every session of 
Congress over the past forty years. This participation, however, has 
not increased in an ord@rly manner due to conflicting goals and values 
of the groups concerned with Uo S., cotton and ove:r.-,dl economic aclljufeJt"" 
ment. 
The lack of genenral publk ag1.reement has resulted in the imple 0 
mentation of W1.ri«:n1~ alt®)l;natives 9 som<!1l of whiich have been ineffective 
or even !;'!Onflicting. The arccumv.tl~tion of l@gi.slation in this atmos .. 
phere has prodm.::ied a cotton progr~m with many fa©®U. Thi® di veridi..ty 
and complexity has lt'®sult@d! in ciClnfusion and misund@1riH:anding si.mong 
both agrfoultu,r:al and non..,.agri©ultu)l;al ind'.ivicluialh and g1roups. 
The major purpose of this study was to provide a history of 
past cotton legbliai.t.ion which could permit a\ better understanding of 
the present and pot®ntial future cotton p~ograms. Particular emphasis 
was placed on production and price legislation that affects the incom® 
of cotton producers. Specific objectiviss of this study werei (1) to 
present the histori©:al devdopment of governmental programs d~signed. 
to a~hieve :ine:om~ objective through specifi©: m®a.ns of pri<1:e support,, 
n 
production controls and export programs; (2) to present the interm 
relationships existing between the specifk pr.ogr.ams and the prices 
and production of cotton as related to the development of subsequent 
legislation. 
The farm price and income drop following World War I prompted 
farmers to persuade the federal gov<ernment to assist with the 1tegulation 
of agricultural cotmnodity markets. The first attempt, an orderly 
distribution program enacted in 1929 9 proved to be unsuccessful due 
to its inability to control outputs. Major legislation in 19339 
therefore 9 turned to production controlso It became apparent in a 
matter of months~ how®v®ir~ that th® enhan~®m®nt of falrnl prices and 
responded by establishing th® «::@mmodity C:nidit Corpoir.r.it,ion to ce1ny 
out price support and related agricultural operations including 
multiple prking pirograms. 
,i 
The Supreme Court ruling in Butl®r vs. t:hei United SU.t®s tempo"" 
Cotton pric®s were supported at about 60 per~ent of parity in 
declined moderat®Jly ,but tendeid t!(ll be neat'lr th® 80 p®'!'<G®nt level fo'!' ,,-
produ~®rs operating under th® higher level of output r@ff1ltrict:if..on. 
Cotton allotments have declined from 27,863,000 acres in 1939~ to 
16,310,000 acres in 1963. 
In attempts to improve producersi incomes while more efficiently 
utili;ing private and public resources, legislation in recent years 
has incorporated an increasing number of multiple pricing plans 
(such as export subsidies and Public Law 480) into the overall cotton 
program. The evolutionary development is reflected in the present 
multi-facet cotton program. 
The logic behind each step along the way may best be explained 
by the nature of our dem©lcratic process. Legislation enacted pre"' 
supposes only that some agrl!!lement had been reached as to the reb.ti ve 
efficiency of this program as compared with alternative programs. 
The degree of agreement 9 how®ver 9 may vary from ve"t;y small to sub0 
sta~tial. One can say only that an organized majority did not expli• 
citly agree to oppose the p~ogr~mo 
Agreement or disagreement involves differences in the amqµnts 
13 
of information available to the various groups involved 9 differences 
in the interpretations of th® so-©®lled ufacts'', and diff®'ir®nlt®S in 
beliefs concerning what uought to be11 • Therefor.®~ legislation ena«::ted 
is usually the result of a compromise or ~rbitration. 
Whether or not government participation will continue to increase 
remains to be seen. Since it represents a means of achieving c~~t~in 
goals and not a goai in itself9 much depends upon the conditions of the 
future. If past history is any indication, however, when major goals 
are involved~ incr®as~d government parti©ipation is likely to be an 
acceptable a©tivityo 
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